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Abstract. Defeasible reasoning is a direction in nonmonotonic rea-
soning that is based on the use of rules that may be defeated by other
rules. It is a simple, but often more efficient approach than other non-
monotonic reasoning systems. This paper presents a family of defea-
sible reasoning formalisms built around Nute’s defeasible logic. We
describe the motivations of these formalisms and derive some basic
properties and interrelationships. We also describe a query answering
system that supports these formalisms and is available on the World
Wide Web.
1 Introduction
Defeasible reasoning is a direction in nonmonotonic reasoning [13].
Defeasible logics were introduced and developed by Nute over sev-
eral years [17]. These logics perform defeasible reasoning, where a
conclusion supported by a rule might be overturned by the effect of
another rule. Roughly, a proposition p can be defeasibly proved only
when a rule supports it, and it has been demonstrated that no rule
supports ¬p. These logics also have a monotonic reasoning compo-
nent, and a priority on rules. One advantage of Nute’s design was
that it was aimed at supporting efficient reasoning, and in our work
we follow that philosophy.
In previous work we have studied a particular, “standard” de-
feasible logic, DL, and derived results concerning its representa-
tional properties [1] and proof theory [10], relationships to other for-
malisms [11, 3], and computational complexity [12].
Logics for knowledge representation and, in particular, non-
monotonic logics have developed greatly over the past 20 years.
Many logics have been proposed, and a deeper understanding of the
advantages and disadvantages of particular logics has been devel-
oped. There are also, finally, some indications that these logics can
be usefully applied [15, 18].
Unfortunately, it appears that no single logic is appropriate in all
situations, or for all purposes. History clearly indicates that while
one logic may achieve desired results in some situations, in other
situations the outcome is not as successful. This is, no doubt, one
reason for the proliferation of non-monotonic logics.
Furthermore, even with a fixed syntax and a common motivat-
ing intuition, reasonable people can disagree on the semantics of
the logic. This can be seen in the literature on semantics of logic
programs with negation, for example, but the point was made more
sharply by [21] who showed in several different ways a “clash of in-
tuitions” for a simple language describing multiple inheritance with
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exceptions. So it appears that no single logic, with a fixed semantics,
will be appropriate.
One way to address this problem is to develop logics that are “tun-
able” to the situation. That is, to develop a framework of logics in
which an appropriate logic can be designed. In fact, families of ap-
proaches have emerged around the classical nonmonotonic systems
of circumscription [14] and default logic [19]. In this paper we show
how the original logic DL can be modified in different directions, to
accommodate different intuitions. In particular, we show how team
defeat (or absence of it) and ambiguity propagation (or blocking) can
be accommodated in our framework. We also show that these ideas
are orthogonal and may be combined as appropriate. A central result
shows the relationship between the various approaches in the form of
increasing deductive power.
As mentioned before one of the advantages of defeasible reasoning
is that it was designed to support efficient reasoning. Therefore pow-
erful implementations can be developed. In this paper we report on an
implementation that supports query answering for defeasible logics.
The experimental evaluation shows that it can deal with knowledge
bases of the order of 100,000 defeasible rules with a response time
of approx. 1 minute [12]. In this paper we will not focus on the ex-
perimental evaluation, but on other interesting features of the system.
For example, it has been implemented in a functional programming
language in a way that mirrors the inference conditions of the for-
malisms it supports. Therefore it can easily be extended to support
further variants.
2 Defeasible Logic
We begin by outlining the constructs in defeasible logics [17]. We
then define the inference rules of a particular defeasible logic DL
that has received the most attention.
2.1 A Language of Defeasible Reasoning
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a set of literals
(called facts), R a finite set of rules, and > a superiority relation
on R. In expressing the proof theory we consider only propositional
rules. Rules containing free variables are interpreted as the set of their
variable-free instances.
There are three kinds of rules: Strict rules are denoted by A→ p,
and are interpreted in the classical sense: whenever the premises are
indisputable (e.g. facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a
strict rule is “Emus are birds”. Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Inference from facts and strict rules only is called definite inference.
Facts and strict rules are intended to define relationships that are def-
initional in nature. Thus defeasible logics contain no mechanism for
resolving inconsistencies in definite inference.
Defeasible rules are denoted by A ⇒ p, and can be defeated by
contrary evidence. An example of such a rule is
bird(X)⇒ flies(X)
which reads as follows: “Birds typically fly”.
Defeaters are denoted by A ; p and are used to prevent some
conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible
rules by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is the rule
heavy(X); ¬flies(X)
which reads as follows: “If an animal is heavy then it may not be
able to fly”. The main point is that the information that an animal is
heavy is not sufficient evidence to conclude that it doesn’t fly. It is
only evidence that the animal may not be able to fly.
A superiority relation on R is an acyclic relation > on R (that is,
the transitive closure of > is irreflexive). When r1 > r2, then r1 is
called superior to r2, and r2 inferior to r1. This expresses that r1
may override r2. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : bird(X) ⇒ flies(X)
r′ : brokenWing(X) ⇒ ¬flies(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made
about whether a bird with a broken wing can fly. But if we introduce
a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then we can indeed conclude
that it cannot fly.
2.2 A Defeasible Logic
As an example of a defeasible logic, we consider the logic of [16],
which has been investigated in [1, 10]. In this presentation we use the
formulation given in [5]. We denote this logic by DL.
A conclusion of a defeasible theory D is a tagged literal. Conven-
tionally [17, 5] there are four tags, so a conclusion has one of the
following four forms:
• +∆q, which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in
D.
• −∆q, which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not
definitely provable in D.
• +∂q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in
D.
• −∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not
defeasibly provable in D.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R
by Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd, the set
of defeasible rules in R by Rd, and the set of defeaters in R by
Rdft. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q. In the
following ∼ p denotes the complement of p, that is, ∼ p is ¬p if
p is an atom, and ∼ p is q if p is ¬q. A rule r consists of its an-
tecedent A(r) (written on the left; A(r) may be omitted if it is the
empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its conse-
quent C(r) which is a literal. In writing rules we omit set notation
for antecedents. Provability is defined below. It is based on the con-
cept of a derivation (or proof) in D = (F,R,>). A derivation is a
finite sequence P = P (1), . . . , P (n) of tagged literals satisfying the
following conditions. The conditions are essentially inference rules
phrased as conditions on proofs. P (1..i) denotes the initial part of
the sequence P of length i.
+∆: If P (i+ 1) = +∆q then either
q ∈ F or
∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i)
−∆: If P (i+ 1) = −∆q then
q 6∈ F and
∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i)
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆ ∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
Let us illustrate this definition. To show that q is provable defea-
sibly we have two choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely
provable; or (2) we need to argue using the defeasible part of D as
well. In particular, we require that there must be a strict or defeasi-
ble rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to
consider possible “counterattacks”, that is, reasoning chains in sup-
port of∼q. To be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show
that ∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider
the set of all rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which
have head ∼ q (note that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas
they could not be used to support the conclusion q; this is in line
with the motivation of defeaters given above). Essentially each such
rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each such rule
s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following
properties: (i) t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be
stronger than (i.e. superior to) s. Thus each attack on the conclusion
q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule.
−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆ ∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or t 6> s
The elements of a derivation are called lines of the derivation. We
say that a tagged literal L is provable in D = (F,R,>), denoted by
D ` L, iff there is a derivation in D such that L is a line of P .
DL is closely related to several non-monotonic logics [2]. In par-
ticular, the “directly skeptical” semantics of non-monotonic inheri-
tance networks [7] can be considered an instance of inference in DL
once an appropriate superiority relation, derived from the topology
of the network, is fixed [4]. DL is a conservative logic, in the sense
of Wagner [22].
2.3 The Principle of Strong Negation
The purpose of the −∆ and −∂ inference rules is to establish that it
is not possible to prove a corresponding positive tagged literal. These
rules are defined in such a way that all the possibilities for proving
+∂q (for example) are explored and shown to fail before −∂q can
be concluded. Thus conclusions with these tags are the outcome of a
constructive proof that the corresponding positive conclusion cannot
be obtained. As a result, there is a close relationship between the
inference rules for +∂ and −∂, (and also between those for +∆
and −∆). The structure of the inference rules is the same, but the
conditions are negated in some sense. We say that the inference rule
for +∂ (−∂) is the strong negation of the inference rule for−∂ (+∂).
The strong negation of a formula is closely related to the function
that simplifies a formula by moving all negations to an innermost
position in the resulting formula. It is defined as follows.
sneg(A ∧B) = sneg(A) ∨ sneg(B)
sneg(A ∨B) = sneg(A) ∧ sneg(B)
sneg(∃x A) = ∀x sneg(A)
sneg(∀x A) = ∃x sneg(A)
sneg(+∂p ∈ X) = −∂p ∈ X
sneg(−∂p ∈ X) = +∂p ∈ X
sneg(¬A) = ¬sneg(A)
sneg(A) = ¬A if A is a pure formula
A pure formula is a formula that does not contain a tagged literal.
Pairs of tags other than +∂,−∂ are treated in an analogous manner
to +∂ and −∂. The strong negation of the applicability condition of
an inference rule is a constructive approximation of the conditions
where the rule is not applicable.
We are led to consider the following Principle of Strong Negation:
For each pair of tags such as +∂,−∂, the inference rule for
+∂ should be the strong negation of the inference rule of −∂
(and vice versa).
ClearlyDL satisfies this principle, as do all the logics we will present
in the following. On the other hand, in Nute’s framework [17] logics
may violate it.
3 New Variants of Defeasible Logic
We now develop several variations of DL. Our interest here is not to
develop definitive defeasible logics, but to demonstrate the flexibility
of the framework. [11] have already defined an extension of DL to
allow a failure operator in the body of rules without disturbing the
semantics of DL on theories without this operator.
3.1 Removing Team Defeat
The defeasible logic we have considered so far incorporates the idea
of team defeat. That is, an attack on a rule with head p by a rule
with head ∼ p may be defeated by a different rule with head p (see
inference rule +∂). Even though the idea of team defeat is natural, it
is worth noting that several related approaches, such as LPwNF [6]
and most argumentation frameworks, do not adopt this idea.
It is easy to define a variant of DL that does not include team
defeat. All we need to change in the inference condition +∂ is clause
(2.3.2) that should now look as follows:
(2.3.2) r > s
In other words, an attack on rule r by rule s can only be defended by
r itself, in the sense that s is weaker than r. We use the tag ∂ntd to
refer to defeasible provability in this variant.
3.2 Ambiguity Propagation
We call a literal ambiguous if there is a chain of reasoning that sup-
ports the conclusion that p is true, another that supports the conclu-
sion that ¬p is true, and the superiority relation does not resolve this
conflict. The following is a classic example of non-monotonic inher-
itance.
Example 1
r1 :⇒ quaker r5 : republican ⇒ footballfan
r2 :⇒ republican r6 : pacifist ⇒ antimilitary
r3 : quaker ⇒ pacifist r7 : footballfan ⇒ ¬antimilitary
r4 : republican ⇒ ¬pacifist
The priority relation is empty.
pacifist is ambiguous since the combination of r1 and r3 support
pacifist and the combination of r2 and r4 support ¬pacifist . Simi-
larly, antimilitary is ambiguous.
In DL, the ambiguity of pacifist results in the conclusions
−∂pacifist and −∂¬pacifist . Since r6 is consequently not appli-
cable, DL concludes +∂¬antimilitary . This behaviour is called
ambiguity blocking, since the ambiguity of antimilitary has been
blocked by the conclusion −∂pacifist and an unambiguous conclu-
sion about antimilitary has been drawn.
A preference for ambiguity blocking or ambiguity propagating be-
haviour is one of the properties of non-monotonic inheritance nets
over which intuitions can clash [21]. Stein [20] argues that ambiguity
blocking results in an unnatural pattern of conclusions in extensions
of the above example. Ambiguity propagation results in fewer con-
clusions being drawn, which might make it preferable when the cost
of an incorrect conclusion is high. For these reasons an ambiguity
propagating version of DL is of interest.
In the example above, the ambiguity blocking behaviour of DL
was caused by the following observation: pacifist is ambiguous, so
−∂pacifist is derivable. Then −∂pacifist is used to invalidate rule
r6, thus leaving the conclusion ¬antimilitary without any counter-
arguments.
The solution to achieve ambiguity propagation behaviour is to sep-
arate the invalidation of a counterargument from the derivation of−∂
tagged literals. We do so by introducing a third level of provability
(besides definite and defeasible provability), called support and de-
noted by
∫
. Intuitively, a literal p is supported if there is a chain of
reasoning that would lead us to conclude p in the absence of conflicts.
In the example above, pacifist is supported although −∂pacifist
can be derived.
Thus in our modification of the +∂ condition, a counterargument
may be disregarded only if a literal in its body is known not to be
supported (− ∫ ), which is stronger than the previous condition that
made it sufficient for a literal in the body not be defeasibly provable.
First we modify the +∂ condition (the −∂ condition is modified ac-
cordingly following the Principle of Strong Negation).
+∂am: If P (i+ 1) = +∂amq then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂ama ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆ ∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : − ∫ a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂ama ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
Next we define the inference conditions for support. If we ignore
the superiority relation we could define it simply as follows.
If P (i+ 1) = +
∫
q then either
+∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +
∫
a ∈ P (1..i)
However, in situations where two conflicting rules can be applied
and one rule is inferior to another, the inferior rule should not be
counted as supporting its conclusion. Thus we refine the inference
rule as follows (− ∫ is defined accordingly):
+
∫
: If P (i+ 1) = +
∫
q then either
+∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
∃r ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(r) : + ∫ a ∈ P (1..i), and
∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂ama ∈ P (1..i) or
r > s
3.3 Combination
It is also worth noting that several features can be easily integrated
in our framework. Here we show the design of an ambiguity propa-
gating defeasible logic without team defeat. To do so we modify the
inference conditions for +∂am and −∂am as follows2:
+∂am,ntd: If P (i+ 1) = +∂am,ntdq then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂am,ntda ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆ ∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : − ∫ a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) r > s
−∂am,ntd: If P (i+ 1) = −∂am,ntdq then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂am,ntda ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆ ∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : + ∫ a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) not r > s
It is quite obvious that +∂am is modified to +∂am,ntd the same
way that +∂ was modified to +∂ntd. This observation underscores
the orthogonality of the two concepts (team defeat, ambiguity prop-
agation).
3.4 Properties and Relationships
First we show that all logics we have described above satisfy the
basic property of coherence:
Theorem 1 There is no defeasible theory T and literal q such that
T ` +δa and T ` −δq, where δ denotes any of the tags we have
presented (∆, ∂, ∂ntd, ∂am, ∂am,ntd,
∫
).
Next we show that there exists a chain of increasing expressive
power among several of the logics.
Theorem 2 +∆ ⊂ +∂am,ntd ⊂ +∂am ⊂ +∂ ⊂ +
∫
.
For each inclusion there are defeasible theories in which the in-
clusion is strict.




must be modified to use+∂am,ntd
and −∂am,ntd instead of +∂am and −∂am respectively.
We wish to point out that this result is deeper that it may look on
the surface. For example, the relation +∂a,ntd ⊂ +∂a appears trivial
since the absence of team defeat makes the logic weaker. But notice
that when the logic fails to prove a literal p and instead proves −∂p,
then that result may be used by the logic to prove another literal q that
could not be proven if p were provable. In fact it is easily seen that
defeasible provability in the original defeasible logic without team
defeat is not weaker than defeasible provability with team defeat.
Consider the following example:
Example 2
a, b, c, d
r1 : a⇒ p r4 : d⇒ ¬p
r2 : b⇒ p r5 : p⇒ ¬q
r3 : c⇒ ¬p r6 :⇒ q
r1 > r3, r2 > r4
Then q is not defeasibly provable in DL (in the sense of−∂q), but
defeasibly provable in DL without team defeat (+∂amq).
As we have mentioned before, all inference conditions in our
framework follow the Principle of Strong Negation. Together with
the previous theorem it follows:
Theorem 3 −∆ ⊃ −∂am,ntd ⊃ −∂am ⊃ −∂ ⊃ −
∫
.
For each inclusion there are defeasible theories in which the in-
clusion is strict.
4 Implementation
The formalisms illustrated above have been implemented in Deimos,
a query answering system. It is a suite of tools that (i) supports our
ongoing research into defeasible reasoning; and (ii) is provided for
public use to apply defeasible reasoning to practical problems. In
accordance with these goals, Deimos was designed to satisfy, in de-
creasing order of significance, the following requirements: (1) cor-
rectness; (2) traceability; (3) flexibility and maintability; and (4) ef-
ficiency. With these goals in mind, Haskell was chosen as the imple-
mentation language.
The most important part of the system is the prover, which at-
tempts to prove a literal at a selected level of proof (definite, defeasi-
ble, support) in the appropriate variant (with or without team defeat
and ambiguity propagation), using backward chaining. This must be
traceable to permit the verification of the inference conditions (im-
portant when adding new inference conditions, for student learning,
and as a means of raising the confidence of external users in the sys-
tem). Haskell’s monadic I/O system allows us to provide a traceable
execution while letting the code almost transparently represent the
inference conditions (that we presented earlier in the paper). As an
illustration of the transparency, we show the representation of the +∂
inference condition in Haskell (where appropriate combinators &&&,
|||, fA, tE are used):
(|--) t (Plus PS d q) (|-)
= t |- Plus PS D q |||
tE (rsdq t q) (\r -> fA (ants t r) (\a -> t |- Plus PS d a)) &&&
t |- Minus PS D (neg q) &&&
fA (rq t (neg q)) (\s ->
tE (ants t s) (\a -> t |- Minus PS d a) |||
tE (rsdq t q) (\u ->
fA (ants t u) (\a -> t |- Plus PS d a) &&& beats t u s))
A big advantage of Deimos is precisely the one-to-one correspon-
dence between the inference conditions and their representation as a
Haskell expression. As such it provides great flexibility as a research
tool because it is easy to verify and easy to modify as new infer-
ence conditions are developed for new defeasible reasoning systems.
In fact the design of the defeasible reasoning logics described above
went hand-in-hand with their implementation. Once the basic frame-
work was put into place, it took us only minutes to implement each of
the variants in Deimos. That way we were immediately able to test
our intuitions on the behaviour of the logics and the relationships
among the logics, before formally proving them.
The prove function prints a trace of all sub-goals. Some state in-
formation is also threaded through the evaluation of the inference
conditions, including a history of all the sub-goals so far encoun-
tered and their corresponding proof status. The history enables loop
detection and saves re-evaluating previously encoutnered goals. The
loop checking guarantees that the prover terminates for all queries. It
should be noted that the history and loop checking functions may be
turned off, if appropriate.
Deimos is available as a command line tool which parses a de-
feasible theory and attempts to prove conclusions, printing a trace if
required.
An alternative user interfact is provided by a CGI version3, which
is also written in Haskell. This web-accessible version is the pre-
ferred interface for most users, and has links to explanatory infor-
mation such as the syntax for all inputs, help, and a complete user’s
manual including the complete code. It also comes with a library of
pre-prepared defeasible theories (we are in the process of enhancing
this library). The present system now consists of about 4000 lines of
Haskell code.
5 Current and Future Work
In this paper we showed that a family of defeasible reasoning for-
malisms can be built around defeasible logic. These formalisms al-
low one to tune the logic according to the needs of some particu-
lar application and according to one’s intuitions. We also described
an implementation of the formalisms, that is designed to be flexible
and easily extendable to include further variants. A main feature of
the implementation is its transparent representation of the inference
conditions; therefore it has been instrumental even in our conceptual
considerations.
Apart from the variants presented in this paper, we are currently
working on further formalisms. We have developed a well-founded
defeasible logic, and are in the process of incorporating dynamic pri-
orities into the framework. We are also working on a full proposi-
tional version of defeasible logic, called plausible logic, and on the
addition of variables to Deimos. Finally we are studying relationships
to systems of argumentation, and are working on applications in the
areas of modelling regulations and business rules, and the legal do-
main. We believe that defeasible reasoning is promising to be used
in practical applications: on one hand it is simple (rule-based) and
sufficiently efficient, and on the other hand it is declarative with all
the associated advantages.
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